Vermont, S (Vermont, Samson) Independent invention as a defense to patent infringement MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 105 (3): 475-504 DEC 2006
Eugene Garfield
garfield at CODEX.CIS.UPENN.EDU
Mon Apr 28 10:44:18 EDT 2008
Email Address: svermont at gmu.edu
Author(s): Vermont, S (Vermont, Samson)
Title: Independent invention as a defense to patent infringement
Source: MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 105 (3): 475-504 DEC 2006
Language: English
Document Type: Article
Keywords Plus: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; INFORMATION COSTS; INNOVATION;
ECONOMICS; RIGHTS; UNCERTAINTY; PORTFOLIOS; SCIENCE; RENTS; RACES
Abstract: Under current law, independent invention is no defense to patent
infringement. This Article argues that independent invention should be a
defense, provided the independent inventor creates the invention before
receiving actual or constructive notice that someone else already created
it. The defense reduces wasteful duplication of effort and enhances
dissemination of inventions without lowering the incentive to invent below
the necessary minimum. To be sure, the defense lowers the incentive for
inventions that face significant odds of being invented by more than one
inventor By enabling a second inventor to compete with a first inventor
the defense essentially breaks up the first inventor's patent monopoly
into a duopoly. Monopoly profits exceed the collective profits of duopoly.
Thus, from the perspective of inventors ex ante the defense reduces the
expected profit for inventions that could be invented by more than one
inventor This Article argues, however that the reduction in expected
profit is moderate and that the reduced expected profit is generally
sufficient. Per Bayes' theorem, the fact that an invention could be
invented by more than one inventor is itself evidence that a moderately
reduced expected profit will still motivate at least one inventor to
create the invention without inefficient delay.
Addresses: George Mason Univ, Sch Law, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
Reprint Address: Vermont, S, George Mason Univ, Sch Law, Fairfax, VA 22030
USA.
Cited Reference Count: 66
Times Cited: 5
Publisher: MICH LAW REV ASSN
Publisher Address: HUTCHINS HALL 621 SOUTH STATE STREET, ANN ARBOR, MI
48109 USA
ISSN: 0026-2234
29-char Source Abbrev.: MICH LAW REV
ISO Source Abbrev.: Mich. Law Rev.
Source Item Page Count: 30
Subject Category: Law
ISI Document Delivery No.: 114FW
US 5960411 1997
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