[Sigifp-l] FW: [Air-L] CFP: Beyond Fake News: The Politics of Disinformation (special issue)

Thu Mar 22 21:42:56 EDT 2018

Colleagues, I thought some of you might be interested in this call for a special issue on Disinformation (see below). I’d be interested in joining/collaborating on a project.

-Shannon

Dr. Shannon M. Oltmann
Assistant Professor
School of Information Science
College of Communication & Information
University of Kentucky
shannon.oltmann at uky.edu
320 Lucille Little Library
Lexington KY 40506
859-257-0788
859-257-4205 (fax)

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From: Air-L <air-l-bounces at listserv.aoir.org> on behalf of Deen Freelon <dfreelon at gmail.com>
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Subject: [Air-L] CFP: Beyond Fake News: The Politics of Disinformation (special issue)

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Hi all,

Chris Wells (UW-Madison) and I are coediting a special issue of the
journal /Political Communication /focusing on disinformation. The
deadline is Oct 1, 2018. The link is http://tiny.cc/polcom-disinfo and
the full call is below. Thought there'd be some interest from some of
you who I know are working on these issues. Best, /DEEN

**************

*Beyond fake news: The politics of disinformation*

Special Issue of /Political Communication/

Editors: Deen Freelon & Chris Wells

Discussions of “fake news” rose to prominence quickly in academic and
journalistic circles following the 2016 US presidential election.
Scholars were quick to note the analytical deficiencies of this term,
which encompasses a wide range of low-quality and potentially harmful
news-like content (Wardle, 2017). The special issue we propose will
focus on one such subtype, /disinformation/, whose political
implications have become particularly pressing after the election.
Although much disinformation is false, this is not its defining
characteristic: rather, disinformation intentionally seeks to bring
about a desired result using whatever messages are most effective, which
can include truth, falsehoods, distortions, and inflammatory opinions.
It is a type of propaganda in which the true source is usually kept
hidden and the goal is often “to engender public cynicism, uncertainty,
apathy, distrust, and paranoia” (Jackson, 2017, n.p.). It should not be
confused with /mis/information, wherein sources believe the content to
be true.

While disinformation has been a standard military tactic for millennia
(Weedon, Nuland, & Stamos, 2017), it has become especially relevant in
global politics for several reasons. First, the decades-long, worldwide
decline in news trust and democratic institutions in general has made
publics more open to messages from disingenuous yet
ideologically-friendly sources. Second, the maturation of social media
as political media has given such sources a highly effective platform to
spread their messages cheaply and quickly. President Donald Trump’s
embrace of disinformation outlets on Twitter (not to mention his
frequent use of the term “fake news”) demonstrates that elites are as
susceptible as ordinary citizens. Third, until very recently, social
media companies did not take disinformation seriously, which allowed it
to thrive with impunity. Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg initially discounted
the importance of “fake news” before later affirming it, and the company
stated that it failed to identify political ads surreptitiously
purchased by the Russian government and targeted at US citizens
(Leonnig, Hamburger, & Helderman, 2017). For its part, Twitter for years
allowed accounts operated by Kremlin-funded disinformation agents to
impersonate legitimate American political actors (O’Brien, 2017).

While communication researchers have developed a focus on misinformation
in recent years (see e.g. Bode & Vraga, 2015; Nyhan, 2010; Weeks, 2015),
the study of disinformation within our field is in its infancy (for a
pioneering study, see Marwick & Lewis, 2017). But the developments
outlined above suggest the topic deserves much more scholarly attention
in contexts around the globe, especially from the field of
communication. The circulation of claims intended to sow discord and
subvert democratic participation is alarming to the extent that their
purveyors may succeed. What is more, the potential effects of
disinformation may radiate far beyond those directly exposed to it. The
possibility that any unknown participant in a media environment may be a
disinformation agent may itself be weaponized: for example, both the
left and right have alleged that the other side has used “paid
protesters” or “crisis actors” in various contexts, such as the recent
high school shooting in Florida. Ultimately, we should study
disinformation because it undermines the fundamental assumptions of
authentic identity and motivation that make productive political
communication possible. And it is likely that disinformation will remain
a core component of our political communication system for the
foreseeable future. Thus, political communication researchers are
especially well-positioned to analyze and explain the political
dimensions of disinformation, as researchers in other fields often
neglect to address these matters.

We seek papers that explore disinformation as a political phenomenon in
accordance with the preceding, whether digital or not. Quantitative,
qualitative, conceptual, and methodological submissions are all welcome,
but all should make a substantial contribution to theory. Possible
topics include (but are not limited to):

  * Disinformation and information automation (e.g.,
    disinformation-spreading bots)
  * Disinformation in comparative perspective
  * Disinformation in the hybrid media system and attention economy
  * Effects and consequences of disinformation
  * Historical perspectives on disinformation
  * Individual differences in susceptibility to disinformation
  * Theorizing disinformation
  * Typologizing disinformation: Understanding differences between
    state-sponsored, corporate, domestic, and transnational disinformation

All submissions should run between 6000 and 8000 words and follow
/Political Communication/’s style guidelines. We will review and publish
on the following schedule:

  * March 2018: Call opens
  * *October 1, 2018*: Initial submission deadline
  * November 2018: Reviews returned
  * 2019: Revision deadline, final decision notifications, and publication

References

Bode, L., & Vraga, E. K. (2015). In Related News, That Was Wrong: The
Correction of Misinformation Through Related Stories Functionality in
Social Media. /Journal of Communication/, /65/(4), 619–638.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12166

Jackson, D. (2017, October 17). Issue Brief: Distinguishing
Disinformation from Propaganda, Misinformation, and “Fake News” –
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY. Retrieved January 20, 2018, from
https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-distinguishing-disinformation-from-propaganda-misinformation-and-fake-news/

Leonnig, C. D., Hamburger, T., & Helderman, R. S. (2017, September 6).
Russian firm tied to pro-Kremlin propaganda advertised on Facebook
during election. /Washington Post/. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/facebook-says-it-sold-political-ads-to-russian-company-during-2016-election/2017/09/06/32f01fd2-931e-11e7-89fa-bb822a46da5b_story.html

Marwick, A., & Lewis, R. (2017). /Media Manipulation and Disinformation
Online/ (pp. 1–104). Data and Society Research Institute. Retrieved from
https://datasociety.net/output/media-manipulation-and-disinfo-online/

Nyhan, B. (2010). Why the “Death Panel” Myth Wouldn’t Die:
Misinformation in the Health Care Reform Debate. /The Forum/, /8/(1).
https://doi.org/10.2202/1540-8884.1354

O’Brien, L. (2017, November 1). Twitter Ignored This Russia-Controlled
Account During The Election. Team Trump Did Not. /Huffington Post/.
Retrieved from
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-ignored-this-russia-controlled-account-during-the-election_us_59f9bdcbe4b046017fb010b0

Wardle, C. (2017, February 16). Fake news. It’s complicated. Retrieved
March 15, 2018, from
https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79

Weedon, J., Nuland, W., & Stamos, A. (2017). /Information Operations and
Facebook/ (pp. 1–13). Facebook. Retrieved from
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/facebook-and-information-operations-v1.pdf

Weeks, B. E. (2015). Emotions, Partisanship, and Misperceptions: How
Anger and Anxiety Moderate the Effect of Partisan Bias on Susceptibility
to Political Misinformation. /Journal of Communication/, /65/(4),
699–719. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12164

--
Deen Freelon, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
School of Media and Journalism, UNC-Chapel Hill
http://dfreelon.org | @dfreelon <https://twitter.com/dfreelon> |
https://github.com/dfreelon
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